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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ARMY: 
FIGHTING WARS AND HEALING THE WORLD 
 





A major phenomenon that has stirred the raging debate over strong intellectual 
property patent protection for pharmaceuticals is the issue of access to medicines. 
Such ownership protection has frequently been criticized in both developed and 
developing countries to be at the expense of public interest. Strong patent protection 
by pharmaceutical companies on their products inherently leads to a rise in the costs 
of essential medicines, making them increasingly less accessible to the disease 
stricken populations. 
 
This paper investigates the possibility of coexistence between patent protection of 
pharmaceuticals and the effective provision of medicine to the people who gravely 
need them, with special attention given to the poor in developing countries.  
 
The importance of patents in our society is significantly emphasized in the research-
intensive pharmaceutical industry, which is one of the most innovative industries in 
the world. The evolution and justifications of patents is traced through the 
conception of intellectual property laws under British influence and theories that 
have formulated over the years.  
 
Secondly, the role of multinational pharmaceutical companies in fostering global 
patent protection and its role in improving the world’s health will be explored. Being 
largely profit-oriented, pharmaceutical companies have often neglected the wider 
public interests and contribute to the growing gap between patients and their 
necessary medicines and treatments. 
 
Next, the international legal framework is a central aspect that has vastly influenced 
the effects of pharmaceutical patents. The consequential impacts of patents on 
pharmaceuticals are explored through the examination of international responses, 
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including an in-depth case study of India. India is an example of a developing 
country that has reaped the benefits of strong patent protection with the appropriate 
measures, actions and domestic laws its government and other private interest 
groups have put in place. 
 
Lastly, this paper will assert that the promotion of public health should not be 
disconnected from the promotion of pharmaceutical inventions. As the presence of 
incentives is essential in supporting a robust pharmaceutical industry, a multi-
layered system comprising of realistic and practical solutions will be advocated as a 
potential and viable solution to attaining harmonization between medical innovation 
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Pharmaceutical Patents in Modern Society 
 
The deliberation over the true meaning of the term ‘intellectual property’ has been 
ongoing for centuries. From old paradigms of tangible forms to atypical intangible 
forms, the notion of ‘property’ has evolved dramatically over the years and now 
includes intellectual work. However, a comprehensive definition still remains elusive 
due to uncertainty hinging onto whether certain forms of intellectual property are 
rightly ‘intellectual’ or ‘property’. 1  In essence, a universal understanding of 
intellectual property may be thought of as a complex mix of different interests that 
protect an intellectual creation through the grant of an exclusive and proprietary 
right, while at the same time, guaranteeing an extent of free access to, and use of 
such works of the mind.  
The legal rights conferred upon the creator to protect his invention or creation for a 
period of time, are known as intellectual property rights which include patents, 
copyright and registered trademarks. Upon satisfying certain statutory requirements, 
intellectual works are expressly stated by legislation to be ‘property’ of the creators. 
At the core of intellectual property rights are the two crucial aspects - property and 
exclusivity. By oscillating between propriety and the sharing of one’s property, the 
various domestic and global intellectual property laws are able to accommodate the 
different and often contradictory interests of intellectual property. 2 
Today, rapid technological advances and powerful waves of new knowledge have 
amplified the importance of intellectual property laws to promote the changes and 
contain the excesses. As a reward and incentive mechanism for fostering innovation 
and creativity, intellectual property plays a vital role in the modern economy by 
promoting healthy competition and encouraging industrial development. Without 
IPRs, the wheel of innovation and inventiveness may slow down or even grind to a 
halt. 
This conventional justification of intellectual property receives the greatest empirical 
                                                        
1 Mark J. Davision, Ann L. Monotti and Leanne Wiseman, Australian Intellectual Property Law 
(Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed., 2012) 1-2 
2 Mark A. Lemley, “The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law (1996) 75 Texas 
Law Review 989, 991 
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credibility with the patent regime3 as patents are notably constructed as engines of 
public availability and usage. The limited duration of patents reflects this egalitarian 
characteristic of intellectual property as it allows for the public to enjoy a substantial 
amount of intellectual creations without the fear of infringement. As such, patent law 
is seen as an instrument for the empowerment of talented upstarts and the promotion 
of access through imposing divulgation of the invention as a counterpart to 
exclusivity.4 
In our highly globalized and competitive world, patents are an especially powerful 
form of intellectual property, especially in the highly research-oriented and 
knowledge-based pharmaceutical industry. While it may seem that the 
pharmaceutical industry manipulates patents for its own economic ends, a historical 
approach to the utilization of patents combined with an analysis of current patent 
issues places this relationship in its proper context. Not only has the pharmaceutical 
industry continuously adjusted to changes in legislation to ensure an effective system 
by which to research, invent, regulate and ultimately patent new medicines, it is 
heavily dependent on the limited monopolies that patents provide in order to recoup 
investment expenses and to create profits. 5  Regardless of how one views the 
extensive profits made by innovative drug companies, such profits combined with 
the hefty number of new products indicate that the pharmaceutical patent system 
does indeed work and clearly fulfills the goals of intellectual property – To 
encourage creativity and increase innovation.  
However, heated discussions regarding the detriments brought about by the current 
patent system on pharmaceuticals reveals another side of the coin. There has been 
skepticism regarding whether the substantial economic profits of pharmaceutical 
companies are at the expense of larger social implications that arise from the issue of 
global accessibility to medicine.  
                                                        
3 Tom G.Palmer, “Are Patents and Copyright Morally Justified? The Philosophy of Property Rights 
and Ideal Objects (1990) 13 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 817, 820  
 
4 Chidi Oguamanam, “Beyond Theories: Intellectual Property Dynamics in the Global Knowledge 
Economy” (2008) 9 Wake Forest Intellectual Property Law Journal 104, 111 
 
5 Stacey B. Lee J. D., “Patently Innovative: How Pharmaceutical Firms Use Emerging Patent Laws to 
Extend Monopolies on Blockbuster Drugs and Intellectual Property, Pharmaceuticals and Public 
Health: Access to Drugs in Developing Countries” (2013) 34 Journal of Legal Medicine 149, 152 
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The creation of pharmaceutical drugs is undeniably considered the noblest of human 
productions6 and yet it is neither freely accessible nor disseminated. For the sake of 
economic exploitation, pharmaceutical companies overzealously impose patent 
protection on their medicines and this in turn raises the prices of drugs that are 
crucial for patients in the less affluent developing nations. This palpable disconnect 
between the current pharmaceutical Research and Development (“R&D”) agenda 
and global public health crisis and the apparent flaw in the reward and incentive 
theory of the patent system makes one question if the possibility for harmonization 
between medical innovation and public affordability does exist. 
This paper argues that a state of co-existence between patent protection of 
pharmaceuticals and the effective provision of medicine to the disease and illness 
stricken populations of the world can be achieved. It explores the possibility of 
balance between these two aspects by investigating the reward and incentive 
justification of current patent regime on pharmaceuticals. The paper further delves 
into the misaligned focus of the pharmaceutical industry in relation to the public 
health crisis, specifically in developing countries, as evidenced by the freezing of 
access to essential drugs and the industry’s lack of interest in fulfilling its 
responsibilities towards the disease stricken populations.  
Part I of this paper traces the historical origins of intellectual property law that 
emerged under British influence in the 16th century. It impresses upon the fact that 
from the beginning, economic justifications were given priority over ideals of free 
dissemination of knowledge and social welfare, a position that is presently reflected 
in the profit motivated pharmaceutical industry. Part II then analyzes the motives and 
duties of multinational pharmaceutical companies. It compares the alleged 
justifications for higher drug prices against the actual motivations of the 
pharmaceutical industry. Part III takes a look at the international legal landscape for 
patent law and the crucial role it plays in influencing the extent of the effects of 
pharmaceutical patents on developing nations. It also examines the flexibilities 
present in international agreements that aim to reduce the negative impacts brought 
about by stricter pharmaceutical patent laws. In Part IV, attention will be given to the 
responses of the international community and will also accentuate the prospect of 
                                                        
6 Christopher J.Longo, “Encouraging Pharmaceutical Innovation to Meet the Needs of Both 
Developed and Developing Countries” (2011) 10 International Journal of Development Issues 92, 96 
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prosperity of developing countries under the international patent regime. This will be 
done through a comprehensive review of the steps India has taken to reduce the 
effects of compliance to international agreements. It will also analyze how India has 
managed to successfully adapt to stronger patent requirements and to also offer 
assistance to other developing countries at the same time. Lastly, Part V proposes the 
development of a multi-layered system that will include stricter patent approval 
procedures, compulsory licensing, and the establishment of patent pools in order to 
establish a harmonious environment for medical innovation and public affordability 
of medicines.  
This paper aims to provide potentially practical solutions to tackle the problem of 
imbalance between pharmaceuticals and public affordability and to motivate 
pharmaceutical companies to alter their policies or adopt a more accommodating 
system towards public interests. It seeks to emphasize the possibility of attaining a 
sustainable profit-making business and the effective provision of medicines in the 
endeavor to heal the world’s health.  
 
PART I – THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS AND JUSTIFICATIONS OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 
 
1. The History of Intellectual Property Law 
 
With the vast and diverse range of intellectual property rights present today, it would 
prove a futile effort to try and pinpoint a single, exact source of origination. The 
roots of IPRs are manifold have developed independently based on different theories, 
ideologies and geographies.7 Despite the challenging attempts made in tracing the 
genealogy of IP law, it is accepted that the British model of intellectual property that 
arose under British guild influence over the Monarchy during the 16th century8 is the 
most widely recognized instance of origination.  
                                                        
7 Ken Shao, “Monopoly or Reward? The Origin of Copyright and Authorship in England, France and 
China and a New Criticism of Intellectual Property” (2011) 41 Hong Kong Law Journal 731, 731-732 
 
8 National Paralegal College, “History and Sources of Intellectual Property Law” (2006-2014) 
<http://nationalparalegal.edu/public_documents/courseware_asp_files/patents/IntroIP/History.asp> at 
September 2013  
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The model dates back to medieval Europe where the English Crown granted patents 
to raise funds and secure control over industries that were considered to be of 
political importance.9 The guilds were given authority by the government to control 
the regulation and conduct of the various industries, including deciding on which 
items could be imported, marketed and produced.10 They also had the power to direct 
the manner in which new inventions and procedures could be introduced to the 
sphere of commerce. The development of intellectual property laws by the British 
guilds at that time was driven by political and religious motivations rather than a 
genuine interest to promote creation and innovation. In 1556, the Stationers’ 
Company’s monopoly in England was established with the primary intention of 
limiting the Protestant Reformation movement's power. 11  By placing the entire 
printing industry under the control of this company, the government and the church 
prevented the dissemination of ideas. Instead of encouraging creativity and 
invention, it seems that the concentration of power by the guilds on the regulation of 
industries that were not earned by innovation, skill or creativity did more to stifle the 
intended goals of intellectual property laws.  
The industrialization of mechanized commercial printing and manufacturing between 
the 16
th to 18
th centuries further strengthened the formulation of intellectual property 
laws by British guild monopolies. 12  Through the establishment of intellectual 
property laws, the Monarchy was able to collect hefty revenue taxes and licensing 
payments. As such, when the risk of disruption by the illegitimate replication of 
property by the commercial printing press 13  and mechanized manufacturing 
equipment arose, the Monarchy took legal measures to protect their golden goose by 
                                                        
9 Markus Krummenacker, “Are “Intellectual Property Rights Justified?” (2000) < http://www.n-a-n-
o.com/ipr/extro2/extro2mk.html > at 11 september 2013 
 
 
10 Paul Goldstein, Copyright, Patent, Trademark and Related State Doctrines: Cases and Materials on 
Intellectual Property Law (Foundation Press, revised 5th ed, 2005) 233-235 
 
11 Daniel J. Henry, “Intellectual Property Rights: Unlocking the Value of this New Asset Class” 
(2011) 1 Technology Innovation Management Review 23, 25 
 
12 Siva Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs: The Rise of Intellectual Property and how it 
Threatens Creativity (NYU Press, 2003) 1, 40. 
13 Ibid, 40-42. 
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ensuring the existence of a monopoly system where the guilds maintained 
proprietary control and exclusionary rights over their works and products 14 . 
Although knowledge and creativity was intentionally suppressed and the actions of 
the government were directed to protecting the national economic interests of 
England,15 the extent of success of British model of intellectual property on the 
nation’s economy was so exceptional that the government could afford to ignore the 
major issue of stifling the world’s creative and knowledge development.16 
Eventually, the restrictions of this pervasive system became so intolerably broad and 
burdensome that they resulted in widespread dissatisfaction and unrest in the 
population.17 The guild monopoly system was thoroughly broken in 1623 upon the 
passing of the English Statue of Monopolies.18 This law aimed to abolish monopolies 
so as to protect public welfare. It also relied on the ‘Incentive Theory’, granting time-
bound exclusivity to the ‘true and first inventors’ in a bid to balance the distaste for 
monopolies with the desire to provide incentives for innovation.19 From that point 
forward, more specific statutes and British common law continued to develop and 
intellectual property law began to undergo a process of refinement.  
Although patent law is generally known to have originated from the Statute of 
Monopolies, the trend of granting patents started as early as during 14th century. In 
its pursuance for technological dominance, England used patent laws to attract 
artisans and to prohibit the replication of its knowledge and inventions by 
economically and technologically more powerful countries such as China and 
India.20 A supplementary purpose of intellectual property laws was to prevent the 
                                                        
14 Assafa Endeshaw, “Intellectual Property Enforcement in Asia: A Reality Check” (2005) 13 
International Journal of Law and Information Technology 378, 378. 
15 Markus Krummenacker, “Are “Intellectual Property Rights Justified?” (2000) < http://www.n-a-n-
o.com/ipr/extro2/extro2mk.html > at September 2013 
16 Joseph Gibbons Llewellyn and Xiao Li Wang, ‘Striking the “Rights” Balance Among Private 
Incentives and Public Fair Use in the United States and China (2008) 7 John Marshall Review of 
Intellectual Property Law 488, 489. 
17 Chris Dent, “Generally Inconvenient: The 1624 Statute of Monopolies as Political Compromise” 
(2009) 33 Melbourne University Law Review 415, 418 
18 Ibid, 425 
19 Daniel J. Henry, “Intellectual Property Rights: Unlocking the Value of this New Asset Class” 
(2011) 1 Technology Innovation Management Review 23, 26 
20 Meera S. Gupta, “Effect of Patent Law Changes and the Innovation Strategy of Chinese and Indian 
Life Science Companies as reflected in US Patent Filings”,  
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sale of illegally replicated products from disrupting the businesses operated by guilds 
within international markets. By doing so, the British were able to hold trade 
exclusivity over its commodities and was consequently able to generate the requisite 
attraction mechanism necessary to draw merchants to its shore.21 With the surge in 
international trade, technology and communications in the 18th century, the legal 
tradition sought to promote freedom of trade. Hence, the Statute of Anne was 
enacted in 1710 under which a further 14-year renewal of patents on top of the initial 
14-year protection period was made possible.22  
In response to England’s competitiveness, other emerging markets built upon the 
British model23 and began to enact their own set of intellectual property regimes with 
the hopes of achieving the same degree of success. Inventors were granted exclusive 
proprietary ownership over their registered works and products while infringers 
faced heavy penalties or had to make compensation to the parties they infringed 
upon.  
The success of the British model is reflected in the eminent intellectual property 
system of the United States of America (“US”). America’s reputation as a 
technological powerhouse in today’s global innovation market24 is highly attributed 
to the transfer of knowledge and technology from the British. However, as protecting 
the interests of inventors and other intellectual workers have not been an important 
concern of the British,  
the contemporary Anglo-American IP regime has perpetuated the inherently selfish 
agendas and shortfalls of its predecessor.25  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
21Albert Wertheimer and Thomas Santella, “The History and Economics of Pharmaceutical Patents” 
(2008) 16 The Value of Innovation: Impact on Health, Life Quality, Safety, and Regulatory Research 
101, 107 
 
22 Ibid, 110. 
23 John G Byrne, “Changes on the Frontier of Intellectual Property Law: An Overview of the Changes 
Required By GATT” (1995 – 1996) 34 Duquesne Law Review 120, 124. 
24 Economist Intelligence Unit, A New Ranking of the World’s Most Innovative Countries (2009) 
<http://graphics.eiu.com/PDF/Cisco_Innovation_Complete.pdf> at 7 September 2013. 




Additionally, the current patent system embodies the remnants of monopoly 
privilege under the British model. Rather than spontaneously evolving to meet new 
needs, as real property rights do, intellectual property rights seem to create a 
situation of scarcity through heavy-handed state action.26 This can be observed in the 
pharmaceutical industry where large multinational pharmaceutical companies control 
the production of essential drugs in order to maintain a price at which they are able to 
reap the most profits and ultimately denying the accessibility of the drugs to those 
who are genuinely in need of them.  
2. Justifications for Intellectual Property Law 
Although the British model casts a dark shadow on the justifications for intellectual 
property laws, there are still several cogent arguments supporting its necessary 
subsistence in our modern world. Many scholars acquiesce the rationalization of IP 
law to the theory by 17th century Philosopher, John Locke.27 Derived from Locke’s 
Second Treatise of Government, the ‘Lockean Theory’ embodies a right-based 
approach and rests on the concept that a person has the right to the work he 
produces.28  
 
Based on the assumption that an uncultivated ‘common’ exists, this approach 
submits that when an individual mixes labour and natural resources from the 
commons, he obtains property rights to his creation and adds value to the public 
sphere. In this way, exclusive ownership does not deprive the society’s enjoyment of 
intellectual property as ‘enough and as good’ is left in the commons.29 Rather, the 
exclusive rights attached one’s creation encourages individuals to place their 
property before the public, further engendering new ideas and spurring creativity. 
                                                        
26 Wesley M. Cohen, Akira Goto, Akiya Nagata, Richard R. Nelson and John P. Walsh, “R&D 
Spillovers, Patents and the Incentives to Innovate in Japan and the United States” (2002) 31 Research 
Policy 1349, 1355 
 
27 John A Simmons, The Lockean Theory of Rights (Princeton University Press, 1992) 1 – 12. 
28 Tom G. Palmer, “Are Patents and Copyright Morally Justified? The Philosophy of Property Rights 
and Ideal Objects (1990) 13 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 817, 831 
29 Simmons, see Note 27, above, 9  
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Given the time-limited nature of IPRs, intellectual goods eventually fully return to 
the public domain.30  
 
Ayn Rand offers a similar argument to Locke’s theory through a more ethical 
approach. She justifies IPRs by recognizing that a man’s mind is the most important 
tool for survival as the exercise of the mind is the means through which one acquires 
the values to live.31 The respect for a person’s property has also been intimately 
linked to Wilhem von Humboldt’s theory on self-development.32 As the creator and 
his creation share an immensely close relationship, the freedom and security afforded 
by intellectual property rights to the creator’s cultivation of his faculties is a 
fundamental factor for the development of the human potential.  
 
Another vein of the Lockean Theory is premised around an economic approach. It 
suggests that property has a vital role in encouraging the expenditure of individual 
effort since the ability to make use of it can be initiated with the remittance of 
money.33 The labeling of an intellectual endeavor as property grants the owner the 
ability to charge a pecuniary premium for the use of his property. This provides an 
incentive for a inventor to create a commercially viable intellectual product, with the 
promise of financial reward through royalties paid to him for the use of his property. 
This financial success not only puts the inventor in a better position to fund further 
attempts at creation but also provides the assurance that he will be duly recognized 
for his efforts through the prohibition of illegal replication. The heightened sense of 
confidence instilled in an inventor to present a protected work to the public also 
generates social progress and creates a chain reaction whereby others would also be 
inspired to bring out their inner creative flairs. 
 
Locke’s rights-based approach is also reflected in Article I, Section 8, of the US 
Constitution which states that the Congress has the power to "promote the progress 
of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the  
                                                        
30 Justin Hughes, ‘The Philisophy of Intellectual Property’ [1988] Georgetown Law Journal 287, 292 
31 Palmer, see Note 28 above, 842 
 
32 Palmer, see Note 28 above, 845 
 
33 Wertheimer, see Note 21 above, 118 
 
 14 
exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries".34 The development of 
intellectual property rights in the US has largely reflected more pragmatic 
considerations, particularly the protection of economic investment. By providing 
economic incentives to authors and inventors, the US hopes to encourage them to 
make innovations and then reward them for revealing their innovative products to the 
public.  
 
Another noteworthy justification is founded upon the ‘Law and Economics’ 
approach that is generally concerned with the role of the law in the efficient 
allocation of economic resources. There is an underlying assumption that rational 
individuals will seek to maximize their economic gains and will be disinclined to act 
if they expect to receive only a marginal economic benefit. However, there is a 
public goods problem due to the intangible nature of intellectual property, which can 
be time-consuming to produce and potentially requires a considerable degree of 
inventiveness or originality. Yet, once this mental investment has been embodied in a 
material form, it may be relatively cheap and easy to reproduce. Without intellectual 
property rights, there is nothing to prevent others from free-riding and taking 
advantage of the intellectual capital without incurring original costs. In this way, 
commercial bodies would be deterred from making the necessary initial investment 
to produce intellectual capital and the market would be greatly impoverished.35  
 
 
3. The Relationship Between Patents and Pharmaceuticals 
 
‘‘The patent system added the fuel of interest to the fire of genius”.36 This veracious 
comment by Abraham Lincoln impresses upon the role of patents in the cultivation 
of an innovative society.   
There is no end to the diseases that afflict humanity as new diseases are continually 
                                                        
34Schwegman Lundberg Woessner, What is the Origin of Intellectual Property Law? 
<http://www.slwip.com/services/faqs/purpose_of_ip_law.html> at 7 September 2013 
35 Van den Bergh, ‘The Role and Social Justification of Copyright: A Law and Economics Approach’ 
[1996] Intellectual Property Quarterly 17, 23 
 
36 Daniel J. Henry, “Intellectual Property Rights: Unlocking the Value of this New Asset Class” 
(2011) 1 Technology Innovation Management Review 23.  
 
 15 
being discovered while known diseases mutate. Even when cures are found, the 
imperative for a more economic approach to disease control as well as for the 
mitigation or elimination of the side effects of existing drugs compel a continuing 
quest for pharmaceutical innovation.  
The pharmaceutical industry is the engine of health services delivery and general 
health promotion in both developed and developing countries. It is a highly research 
driven and intensive industry that thoroughly asserts the essential role of R&D in 
pharmaceutical innovation. The process of innovation in the pharmaceutical sector is 
both lengthy and expensive as it transverses upstream activities like platform 
research to downstream activities like clinical trials, regulatory approvals, drug 
manufacturing and other capital-intensive promotional activities.37 It is estimated 
that the cost of bringing a new drug into the market is close to US$800 million while 
the elongated time frame is said to be between a 10 to 15 years38. Over the years, 
there has been a rapid increase in the spending for pharmaceuticals from 
approximately US$28 in 1980 to US$870 in 2007.39 
Despite the capital-intensive and complex landscape for pharmaceutical innovation 
or R&D, large multinational pharmaceutical companies and their stakeholders argue 
that there is not much guarantee for profitability of investment in breakthrough 
drugs. 
Much of the industry’s growth is driven by the rapid rate of innovation, which is 
fueled by the financial rewards afforded to the pharmaceutical industry through 
intellectual property protection. The ability of firms to appropriate at least some of 
the value created by their innovations is essential if there is to be incentive to 
innovate.40 Furthermore, the justifications for intellectual property protection suggest 
                                                        
37 Chidi Oguamanam, “Patents and Pharmaceutical R&D: Consolidating Public-Private Partnership 
Approach to Global Public Health Crises” (2010) 13 The Journal Of World Intellectual Property 556, 
557. 
38 Ibid, 557. 
39 Longo, Christopher J., “Encouraging Pharmaceutical Innovation to Meet the Needs of Both 
Developed and Developing Countries” (2011) 10 International Journal of Development Issues 92, 97 
 
 
40 Cohen, Wesley M., Akira Goto, Akiya Nagata, Richard R. Nelson and John P. Walsh, “R&D 
Spillovers, Patents and the Incentives to Innovate in Japan and the United States” (2002) 31 Research 
Policy 1349, 1354 
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that the presence of incentives is directly proportional to the effect of stimulus. This 
justifies the overpricing of pharmaceuticals on the basis that pecuniary reward is a 
necessary mechanism that provides creators with an incentive to continually create or 
innovate. 
Given its unique nature, it is often argued that without a strong patent protection, 
innovation in the pharmaceutical sector would be difficult to sustain as 
pharmaceutical development loses its profitability and ultimately its momentum. 
Hence, patents provide pharmaceutical companies with the needed assurance that 
they will reap the profits of their hard labour in the creation of new medicines.   
Being a critical component in the intensely competitive pharmaceutical environment 
coupled with the growing need for the effective distribution of medicines at the local 
and personal level, patents are increasingly regarded as essential tools for insuring 
that future strides are made to ensure new life-saving drugs are created. The 
historical justifications for intellectual property rights are shown to be most fitting in 
the context of the pharmaceutical industry. Hence, there is a vital need for a stronger 
and more exclusive protective regime in the industry for greater developments in 
pharmaceutical innovation.41 
 
4. The Current Conflict: Criticisms of Patents in the Pharmaceutical Industry  
 
It is commonly held that patents are a crucial factor in spurring development of new 
medicines, and must be protected even if doing so prevents access by those who need 
them the most. Yet the preference for protection over access is not universal, 
particularly when the product at issue relates to human health. Many scholars believe 
that intellectual property protection should not be a barrier to distribution of 
pharmaceuticals in areas facing a human health crisis.  
 
Nevertheless, the rapid rate of pharmaceutical innovation comes at a price. Although 
many pharmaceutical innovations offer much promise at improving the health of 
global populations, their high costs often result in equity of access issues. This 
negatively affects the poor in both developed and especially developing countries, as 
                                                        
41 Oguamanam, see Note 37 above, 567  
 
 17 
they are unable to afford the expensive new medicines.42 In fact, the expansion of 
TRIPS that extended compulsory patent rights on pharmaceuticals to developing 
countries further aggravated the accessibility issue. Additionally, the desire for 
profits and the lack of financial incentives have induced the pharmaceutical 
industry’s failure to directing a sufficient amount of attention towards solving the 
distressing health issues present in developing countries.  
In particular, the magnitude of the AIDS crisis has drawn attention to the alarming 
fact that millions of people in the developing world lack access to medicines that are 
needed to treat disease and alleviate suffering. With close to 8000 people dying of 
AIDS in the developing world each day, the demand for life-saving medication is 
growing expeditiously. Yet patent-holding pharmaceutical companies have carelessly 
neglected the interests of the suffering population. 
Presently, many new medicines that are vital for the survival of millions are too 
costly for the vast majority of people in poor countries. In addition, investment in 
R&D towards the health needs of people in developing countries has almost come to 
a standstill. Three-quarters of the world population live in developing nations yet 
these countries account for less than 10% of the global pharmaceutical market.43 It is 
unlikely that TRIPS will encourage adequate R&D in developing countries for 
diseases as poor countries do not provide sufficient profit potential to motivate R&D 
investment by the pharmaceutical industry. Developing countries have constantly 
come under pressure from industrialized countries and the pharmaceutical industry to 
implement patent legislation that goes beyond the obligations of TRIPS.  
Our world is currently in a transitory period where the global governance regime for 
intellectual property rights has been established but the political community on 
which the justification of intellectual property itself depends on is far from 
globalized. While mechanisms exist at the national level to ameliorate problems that 
the balance of private rewards and public benefits might produce, few mechanisms 
                                                        
42 Christopher J. Longo, “Encouraging Pharmaceutical Innovation to Meet the Needs of Both 
Developed and Developing Countries” (2011) 10 International Journal of Development Issues 92, 97 
 
43 Ellen T’Hoen, “TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, and Access to Essential Medicines: A Long Way 
from Seattle to Doha” (2002) 3 Chicago Journal of International Law 27, 36 
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exist at the global level.44 It seems that the private rights of patent holders in the 
pharmaceutical industry are being purchased at too great a social cost in the 
developing world.  
On the other hand, pharmaceutical companies have argued that the health pandemic 
in developing countries will not be halted merely by the abrogation of drug patents as 
such social issues inherently involve the presence of an effective government and 
appropriate policies that are able to alleviate poverty in the country. In addition, 
multinational enterprises claim that extending strong intellectual property rights to 
the developing countries would bring them greater inflow of Foreign Direct 
Investment (“FDI”) in production and transfer of technology, all of which help raise 
the living standards in these countries. 45 Regardless, this phenomenon raises an 
important and problematic aspect of the globalized regime for intellectual property 
rights.46 
It is truly a feat to achieve the optimal level of pharmaceutical patent protection for a 
given economy but it is also impossible. This is where the level in which the 
contribution of incentives of the patent system to the pharmaceutical innovation and 
the contribution of access to medicines to the health level is maximized. 47  In 
attaining this proper balance between innovation incentives and access to medicines, 
both developed and developing countries will be in a better position to achieve its 
economic growth potential than those with unbalanced systems. 
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PART II – THE PURSUIT OF PROFITS: ROLES AND MOTIVATIONS OF 
THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY  
 
This research-based pharmaceutical industry is one of the most innovative sectors in 
the world. Over the past century, it has played a unique role in developing new and 
improved medicines and vaccines to prevent and treat diseases and conditions. 
However, the trade-off between promoting competition and protecting intellectual 
property has also emerged as a principal issue in international policy.  
 
The major complaint concerning current international patent law is the imbalance 
between rights of the pharmaceutical companies and the lack of obligation to provide 
access to essential medicines.
 
Despite the assurance from the developed countries 
that the global patent system is a stimulant for pharmaceutical innovation, research, 
and development, these processes are in reality, almost exclusively confined to the 
private sector and areas of profitable return. 
1. Responsibilities of the Pharmaceutical Industry  
 
Pharmaceutical R&D has dramatically improved the lives of patients. Medical 
discoveries have increased the life expectancy and resulted in a better quality of life 
for many. The industry has also developed more than 20 antiretroviral treatments for 
HIV/AIDS, essential in control of the epidemic. The number of AIDS related deaths 
worldwide peaked at 2.1 million in 2004 and has since fallen to an estimated 1.8 
million deaths in 2009.48  
 
The industry’s success rests on continuous innovation. Despite challenging business 
conditions, the industry undertakes investments that are considerably more risky than 
those in other high-technology sectors. By investing billions of dollars and long 
hours in R&D, it pushes the limits of science, improves global health and contributes 
to the prosperity of society. Accordingly, the research-based pharmaceutical industry 
globally spent over USD$120 billion on pharmaceutical R&D in 2008. Today, the 
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cost of developing a single medicine can go above a billion dollars.49 Rising R&D 
costs and more stringent testing requirements have been accompanied by a decline in 
new medicine approvals. Without patents, it is estimated R&D outlays would be 
reduced by 64%, jeopardizing the well being of future patients and the innovation 
process itself.50 
 
Beyond innovation, companies hold a wider responsibility to ‘do no harm,’ by acting 
with integrity, complying with national laws, respecting human rights, applying fair 
labour norms, protecting the environment, and working against corruption to prevent 
harm to people, communities and future generations. 
At present, Novartis and the Novartis Foundation for Sustainable Development 
(NFSD) are involved in a wide range of measures to improve patient access to 
medicines and health services, including for the poorest in developing countries. In 
2011, an estimated 1.1 billion people were protected and treated with Novartis 
products and 89 million of these disadvantaged people benefited from Novartis 
access-to-medicine programmes valued at US$1.7 billion. 
2. Motivations of the Development of Medicines 
 
Generally, there are several reasons that multinational pharmaceutical companies 
give in support of patents on pharmaceuticals. In relation to alternative schemes to 
encourage innovation, the patent system has endured as a resilient mechanism. For 
many pharmaceutical industry advocates, the patent regime is not entirely 
satisfactory as a guarantor of risk capital for pharmaceutical innovation. 51  
Pharmaceutical companies are unrelenting in their campaign for proprietary 
protection of ancillary information and regulatory data generated from downstream 
protocol for the approval of new drugs. They have continued to push for longer 
patent terms to leverage market competition in the industry and to delay the entrance 
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of generic drug makers to the market and have been immensely successful in those 
endeavors. 52  Indeed, the only significant reward and incentive mechanism in 
pharmaceutical innovation is patent-based pharmaceutical R&D.  
Firstly, without tight control or legal assurance regarding the exclusivity of the 
manufacturing process and the resulting product, it is quite easy for others to 
replicate the breakthrough drugs and produce generic versions. With the right 
information, a free-rider can put such replicates into the market within a period short 
period of about 6 months when it took 10 years of pharmaceutical R&D to produce 
the original product. The pharmaceutical industry is one of three technology-based 
industries in which the patent virtually equals the product. Unlike industries that 
produce products requiring expensive and complex manufacturing infrastructures, 
the patented products of pharmaceutical companies can be easily and cheaply 
replicated by copiers with little capital investment. Since capital investment in the 
pharmaceutical industry disproportionately is directed to laboratory research and 
clinical trials rather than the manufacture of the final product, patent exclusivity is 
the only effective way to protect and receive a return on that investment.53 
Second, even with legal assurance of exclusivity for the manufacturer of a 
breakthrough drug, market exclusivity is not necessarily guaranteed. It does not 
foreclose the entrance of follow-on drugs, which are new drug entrants to a 
therapeutic class that has already been defined by a separate drug entity that has 
obtained a regulatory approval for marketing. 54  However, these drugs bring 
additional values worthy of patent protection as they may involve a simplified and 
cost-effective delivery or dosage regimen or may target a specific population group 
that is vulnerable to extreme side effects of a breakthrough drug. Overall, they assist 
in making drug prices competitive, suggesting that even with patent protection, drugs 
can still be made affordable to the public.  
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Thirdly, in addition to its expensive nature and elongated duration, pharmaceutical 
R&D is a particularly risky venture from both an investment and a health 
perspective.55 The apprehension about drug failure is a constant cause for worry. A 
combination of scientific and economic reasons, not to mention safety 
considerations, accounts for high failure rates for new drugs. In any event, when drug 
failure happens or when drug development research is terminated prematurely, this 
underscores the risky and expensive nature of the economics of pharmaceutical 
R&D.  
The culture of medical research emphasizes very early disclosure of inventions, 
usually long before a resulting product can be placed on the market. This is because 
scientists working in the field of human pathology have an obligation to share their 
findings as soon as possible56 with their peers so that those peers will be able to 
benefit from the new knowledge in their own research. The pharmaceutical industry 
is also heavily regulated by government agencies to assure the safety and efficacy of 
products that will be sold to consumers. As such, the lengthy time period between 
patent filing and placing a product on the market means that pharmaceutical 
manufacturers receive far shorter periods of patent exclusivity than is the case for 
other patent dependent industries.  
Nowhere has the patent incentive been more successful in attracting investment in 
technology that in the commercial pharmaceutical industry. In the US, a combination 
of a strong patent system and a market without price controls led to a massive flow 
of investment into the American industry. Expenditures on research increased from 
$1.7 billion in 1977 to $26.4 billion in 2002.57 The result for the US economy is that 
since 1990, the patent-driven pharmaceutical industry grew twice as fast as the 
economy at large.  
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3. Fulfilling its Role: Analysis of the Pharmaceutical Industry’s Justifications for 
Patent Protection  
 
Although pharmaceutical companies often claim they need intellectual property 
enforcement to help recoup their investments but a close look reveals that a 
substantial part of R&D is paid for by the public.58 Jamie Love argues that the 
pharmaceutical companies do not even own the rights to the drugs in the first place 
as many of the anti-retroviral drugs used to treat HIV/AIDS today stem from the 
government-funded cancer drug research of the 1980s.59 The rights to government-
created innovations were sold to pharmaceutical companies at low prices. Given the 
public investment on drugs, drug companies do not possess the moral authority to 
determine who can or can’t access them. 
 
While pharmaceutical companies have no doubt created life-saving drugs that have 
saved millions of lives, they have also participated in controversial practices around 
the world that are seen to conflict with their duties to society and have come under a 
growing amount of criticism.  
Dumping onto Poor Countries and the Testing of Drugs 
There have been instances where pharmaceutical companies appear to show their 
humanitarian side and purport to want to improve the access to medicines in 
developing countries. US-based drug company, Eli Lilly, made the largest 
pharmaceutical donation to provide an antibiotic to 1.3 million people in Rwanda 
during their refugee crisis in 1994.60 However, the drug was not listed under the 
World Health Organization’s (“WHO”) list of essential drugs for treating refugees. 
Furthermore, many of the pills were past their expiration date. Instead of alleviating 
the situation in the country, Eli Lilly further aggravated the suffering from the 
aftermath of a civil conflict.  
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In an effort to reduce production costs, pharmaceutical companies have carried out 
human trials on people in the developing world, without their permission. Upon news 
of a northern Nigerian town of Kano being severely affected by meningitis, the 
world’s biggest and richest drug company, Pfizer, moved quickly into Nigeria with a 
new drug, Trovan and claimed that it was a “potential life-saver and a potential 
billion dollar money spinner”,61 despite the fact that the drug had not undergone any 
formal trials beforehand. 
Reluctant Attitudes  
Despite the serious state of the world’s health due to the lack of access to medicines, 
the pharmaceutical industry does not seem bothered and have been reluctant to 
change their business strategies to cater more to the public. Representatives of 
pharmaceutical companies like Bernard Lemoine, the director-general of the 
National Pharmaceutical Industry Association displayed his annoyance at the 
campaign being waged on this issue and stressed that positive action such as 
temporary price reductions and monetary grants to foundations, have been made by 
the laboratories. Yet the present situation sees pharmaceutical companies setting 
their own prices, selecting the markets that will push their share prices up and 
opposing every outside initiative.62  
Before 1998, Thailand’s only drug, Triflucan that could treat a fatal disease 
associated with AIDS was manufactured locally by American laboratory, Pfizer. It 
was effective but extremely expensive at US$330 for a pack of 50 tablets, an amount 
that equated to one and a half times an executive’s salary in that country. 63  
Subsequently, two Thai companies managed sell an equivalent product at a price that 
was much more affordable than Triflucan. However, Pfizer alerted the US 
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government and banned the sales of the drugs under the Thai companies and even 
threatened the Thai authorities that it would impose a duty on their main exports if 
they did not stop producing the drug. 
Lack of Emphasis on Tropical Diseases 
 
There more emphasis is placed on profitable research and cures for problems such as 
impotence and ‘diseases of affluence and longevity’, while many tropical diseases 
are given far less attention.64 Tropical diseases are almost entirely confined to the 
developing world and do not represent a profitable market for the pharmaceutical 
industry.
 
In recent years, thousands of new compounds have been created but only 
1% of the 1,400 new medicines created in the last 25 years were developed for the 
treatment of tropical diseases.65 Multinational pharmaceutical companies neglect the 
diseases of the tropics, not because the science is impossible but because there is 
essentially, in the terms of the harsh economics of the drugs companies, no market.  
 
In developing countries with relatively small commercial markets and low levels of 
disposable income, there is very little incentive for pharmaceutical companies to 
conduct extensive research and development in creating drugs for life-threatening 
diseases limited mostly to the developing world.66
 
Pharmaceutical companies often 
tout their strengths of having vast capital resources to do research, bringing benefits 
to humanity the world over. Unfortunately though, the quest for more profits is a 
hindering factor to what they will research. Tropical disease cures are not profitable 
for them because most people with such diseases are too poor to afford cures. 
Pharmaceutical companies judge that they would not get sufficient return on research 
investment and both with creating drugs for diseases that plague the poor. Instead, 
they argue that their obligation is to their shareholders67, who demand that they put 
the effort into trying to find cures for the diseases of affluence and longevity such as 
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heart disease, cancer and Alzheimer’s.68 
Although several posters of major drug companies present the image of a caring 
company that brings benefit to humanity and relieves the suffering of the sick, the 
truth is that their humanity has not extended beyond the limits of the pockets of the 
sick.69 
 
The industry makes a major contribution to the prosperity of the world economy. It is 
a robust sector that has been one of the pillars of industrialized economies and is 
increasingly proving to be an important sector in the developing world as well. It 
contributes to employment, trade, expenditure on R&D and technological capacity 
building. It is also a necessary foundation for the existence of the generic industry.  
 
In actuality, it is not that patent legislation is bad but simply that pharmaceutical 
companies have manipulated its loopholes to secure high profits. Patents are shown 
to have important and pervasive effects on information diffusion and R&D 
spillovers, and perhaps, in turn, on the efficiency of innovative effort. This 
information diffusion effect of patents deserves at least some recognition in the 
development of essential medicines. Ultimately, pharmaceutical companies should 
look towards changing priorities as they have at present, failed to thoroughly fulfill 
their responsibilities to the society.  
 
PART III: THE INTERNATIONAL LANDSCAPE 
1. Dissecting the TRIPS Agreement 
The present international standard of patent protection in the pharmaceutical industry 
is governed primarily by the TRIPS agreement that was adopted by the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) at the end of the Uruguay Round in 1994. Prior to the creation 
of the WTO, national intellectual property laws were largely unregulated within the 
system under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”). Although the 
details of patent protection remained largely left to national discretion after the 
                                                        
68 May 2001 the Guardian newspaper  
69 The Guardian, “A Bitter Pill for the World’s Poor” (2000) 
<http://www.globalissues.org/article/52/pharmaceutical-corporations-and-medical-research > at 27 
October 2013 
 27 
formation of the WTO, it is observed that TRIPS substantially utilized the limits of 
intellectual property rights and generated clear gains for the pharmaceutical industry 
and the developed world.70 
As the result of powerful members of the international community coming together 
to create a uniform set of international intellectual property rules, TRIPS establishes 
the minimum level of patent protection that all countries within the WTO are 
subjected to apart from other broad provisions in the GATT treaty.71 The agreement 
stipulates a minimum of 20 years patent protection on pharmaceuticals, prohibiting 
potential competitors from producing and marketing cheap generics of 
pharmaceutical products during this period.
 
This gives the pharmaceutical patent 
holder a monopoly based on the exclusive marketing rights on its patented product 
for at least 20 years.  
Up until the entry into force of TRIPS in 1995, developing countries could and did 
disallow patent protection for pharmaceutical products in their national patent laws. 
TRIPS gave developing countries a transition period of 10 years from 1995 before 
they were required to enact a bill incorporating product patent protection while least 
developed countries have until 2016 to comply with its provisions.72 In addition, all 
member countries are required to take steps to provide for the receipt of product 
patent applications in all areas of technology and on the basis of such applications, 
they should grant exclusive marketing rights for 5 years or until the patent is granted, 
whichever is earlier. 73  The WTO’s Dispute Settlement Board ensures member 
country compliance and stipulates that the governments of member countries have to 
introducing the stringent patent laws provided in TRIPS in their domestic laws. In 
the event of the failure to meet such obligations, countries face severe penalties from 
the WTO or trade sanctions from prosecuting countries.  
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In 2003, the WTO adopted a decision to amend TRIPS in order to enhance access to 
essential medicines in developing countries. In working towards a mutually 
supportive relationship, the World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") also 
adopted an agenda to further the development of countries by considering different 
intellectual property regimes appropriate to the circumstances of a particular country 
or region. The amendment provided that all Members of the WTO have to make 
available, with limited exceptions, both product and process patents in every sector, 
including pharmaceuticals. Professor A. Samuel Oddi opines that the driving force 
behind the amendments in TRIPS was motivated by the endeavor to protect the 
rights of inventors, active lobbying by multinational pharmaceutical firms and strong 
pressure received from the US and other developed countries.74  
TRIPS was theoretically designed as a social policy tool to encourage innovation by 
establishing minimum standards for the protection of intellectual property and to 
ensure that the measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property rights should 
not hinder legitimate trade. The major justification for the issuance of patents is seen 
to be in line with historical theories with
 
Article 7 of TRIPS providing that 
exclusivity given by intellectual property rights will promote both technological 
innovation and the transfer and dissemination of new products in an advantageous 
manner that is ‘conducive to social and economic welfare’.75  
The standards developed under TRIPS are based on the Western European and North 
American property law in wealthy developed countries with little regard for the 
needs of developing countries.76 On the surface, the WTO seems to administer the 
current international trade rules when its actions are actually dictated by the 
governments of developed countries and powerful pharmaceutical companies. 
Although TRIPS has further increased pharmaceutical trade in developed countries, 
it has failed to generate substantial gains for developing countries. The unequal trade 
between developed and developing countries raises the worrying issue of access to 
medicines.  
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The application of TRIPS in developing countries has become increasingly important 
with the full entry into force of the patent obligations in 2005. The global patent 
protection system has created an extremely profitable and powerful group of 
multinational pharmaceutical companies that are, by law, allowed to deny access to 
life-saving medicines. By restricting the right of governments to allow the 
production, marketing, and import of low-cost copies of patented medicines, known 
as generic drugs, the WTO’s rules restrict competition, increase prices, and further 
reduce the already limited access of poor people to vital medicines. 77  Without 
reform, the access of poor people in developing countries to medicines will continue 
to be severely diminished.  
It is important to note that even under the TRIPS regime, patents are to be granted 
only on applications received from 1995 onwards for new, patentable pharmaceutical 
inventions.78 Thus, the prices of existing pharmaceuticals already on the market, or 
even those covered by patent applications prior to 1994 anywhere in the world, 
should not be affected as these markets could continue to be as contestable as 
before.79  
In an attempt to tackle inequality in access issue, the concept of situational flexibility 
has been considered. This willingness to take individual circumstances into account 
is a significant development for developing countries as the approach is distinctly 
relevant to the issue of extending transition periods and striking the appropriate 
balance between the rights of producers and users of intellectual property. In 
particular, the least developed countries want to strengthen such special and 
differential treatment measures in TRIPS.80 Additionally, Paragraph 44 of the Doha 
Ministerial Declaration reaffirms the mandate that "provisions for special and 
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differential treatment are an integral part of the WTO Agreements". 81 However, 
while there is recognition of the need to adopt special and differential treatment to 
the individual circumstances of WTO members, the negotiating progress regarding 
the appropriate criteria to be applied has been rather stagnant.  
In its current form, TRIPS has been criticized to be a ‘vehicle for Western 
imperialism’ over developing countries as it has resulted the forcing open of markets 
to several United States pharmaceutical corporations regardless of the social costs 
and detriments to human health. It is strongly argued that the strong patent protection 
in TRIPS was enacted to benefit private industry at the expense of poorer nations, 
rather than to promote innovation and benefit society as a whole. 
Matthew Kramer, describes the adoption of TRIPS as one aspect of the gradual move 
towards economic globalization and a step in a multinational effort spanning half a 
century. This modern theory focuses on the idea that the strong patent protection is 
essential to a stable international economy not solely because it promotes innovation 
but rather, its role as a major component for maintaining and strengthening the 
multilateral trading system. 82 
2. The Doha “Solution” 
The implications for public health of the TRIPS agreement led developing countries 
to propose, and obtain adoption in 2001, of the WTO ministerial Declaration on the 
TRIPS agreement and public health (“the Declaration”). This declaration affirmed 
WTO members’ rights under Art.8 to the sovereign right to take measures to protect 
public health through certain flexibilities in the TRIPS agreement designed for that 
purpose. These include identification of patentability standards that might exclude 
the patenting of trivial developments, grants for compulsory licenses to allow third 
parties to produce or sell a drug, against payment of a royalty to the patent owner 
when drugs are not sufficiently supplied or are not affordable and admittance of 
parallel imports that allow access to patented drugs legitimately sold in a foreign 
country at reduced prices without the consent of the patent holder.83 Many public 
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health advocates welcomed Doha as an important achievement because it gave 
primacy to public health over private intellectual property, and clarified WTO 
Members’ rights to use TRIPS safeguards. 
The Declaration was initiated by a statement from the African community to the 
TRIPS Council highlighting the grave nature of the matter on the access to medicines 
with reference to the devastating AIDS crisis in Africa. The TRIPS Council then held 
a discussion regarding intellectual property issues in the context of public health for 
the first time and the African Group proposed issuing separate declarations on access 
to medicines. The text for the Declaration drafted by the chair of the WTO General 
Council, Mr. Stuart Harbinson, that was the basis for the negotiations in Doha as it 
was one which recognized that measures can be taken or health in general and not 
just instances of health crisis. 
After 3 days of negotiation, the participating embers reached a compromise that was 
built mainly upon negotiations between Brazil and US. The text acknowledged the 
unmitigated right of countries to take measures to protect public health and may 
override intellectual property rules if they act as barriers to that cause.  
Paragraph 5 of the Declaration set out the safeguards in TRIPS that can be used to 
overcome obstacles by intellectual property and it was also made clear that the use of 
compulsory licenses is not restricted to cases of national emergencies only. Although 
several members of developed nations proposed for the language of the agreement to 
limit measures like compulsory licensing to emergency situations like pandemics or 
specified diseases like HIV/AIDS, they were unsuccessful. The Declaration 
expanded the scope of interpretation of what constitutes a national emergency and 
made the process issuing of compulsory licenses much faster and easier.  
Although the Doha Declaration broke new ground in guaranteeing Members’ access 
to medical products, it did not solve all of the problems associated with intellectual 
property protection and public health. Many developed countries did not keep to the 
promises made in the Declaration and there was also the failure to reach an 
agreement to allow the production and export of generic medicines in the face of 
current health needs in developing countries. Hence, there is indication that the 
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optimism felt at Doha was premature considering the severity of the lack of access 
issue that presently plagues the poor in both developed and developing countries.84  
In relation to the flexibilities in the TRIPS Agreement, Alan O’ Sykes takes the same 
view as Ellen ‘t Hoen in recognizing the inadequacy of the Doha declaration.85 He 
stands in favour of the TRIPS Agreement in solving issue on the lack of access to 
medicines in developing countries, a clear humanitarian issue that must be 
approached with both a soft heart and a hard head.86 He is of the view that in holding 
out the prospect of compulsory licensing and parallel importation policies, the Doha 
Declaration cast doubt on the future credibility of patent rights for pharmaceuticals in 
the developing nations. The stationary nature of research into tropical diseases 
prevalent in developing countries is due to the lack of patent protection.87 It is argued 
that drugs that treat serious and widespread conditions are most valuable to society 
and upon which R&D has the greatest potential payoff. However, in adhering to the 
Doha Declaration, the requirement of developers of such drugs to sacrifice their 
intellectual property rents when countries declare a ‘national emergency’ in order to 
take advantage of compulsory licensing, discourages research in the areas where it 
has the most potential to yield high returns.88 
3. Bending the Rules: Pertinent Provisions in TRIPS 
The greatest conflict between intellectual property protection and human health 
occurs when a nation faces a severe health emergency but the average person cannot 
afford access to essential medicines. In order for equal access to life-saving 
medicines, there needs to be equal access to legal rights that affect that access. There 
are implicit and explicit exceptions contained within TRIPS through which member 
states can utilize to meet national needs with respect to public health. 89  These 
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flexibilities, if used effectively, could mitigate the present tension in TRIPS and 
provide developing countries with ammunition to combat some of their lack of 
access problems.
  
It should be noted that any Articles (“Art.”) referred to in this section are those found 
under the TRIPS.  
Art. 8 
Art.8 is an implicit exception, which mandates that in creating domestic laws, 
member countries may adopt measures necessary to protect public health and to 
promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and 
technological development. Hence, it provides possible grounds that developing 
country governments could use to combat tropical diseases such as HIV/AIDS. 
Although, the word ‘necessary’ used in the article indicates that the government does 
not have complete discretion to use these measures and that its use is subject to 
review by the WTO, the WTO could use this discretion to help developing country 
governments combat life-threatening diseases.
 
For instance, it could grant a 
developing country government ‘substantial latitude’ if the country is facing a health 
crisis as pursuant to the clarification of TRIPS in the Doha Declaration. 90  
Additionally, since Art.8 was intended to be a guiding principle, developing country 
governments can take public health and development measures reflected in the 




Under TRIPS, patent owners are given the exclusive right to prevent third parties 
from making, using, selling or importing a patented product without their consent. 
Art.30 and 31 play a key role in balancing the rights of patent owners against the 
needs of consumers of patented products or pharmaceuticals as they authorize 
exceptions to the rules. These explicit exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by 
TRIPS equip developing country governments with significant tools to improve 
access to essential medicines and to successfully cater to the public interest of their 
citizens aside from the proprietary claims of patent holders. 
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Art.30 permits ‘limited exceptions’ to patent rights, which are satisfied by the 
presence of three criteria, namely that the exception must be limited, must not 
unreasonably conflict with the normal exploitation of the patent and must not 
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner.91 There has been 
a divergence of several academic opinions regarding the interpretation of Art.30 in 
the authorization of generic exports.   
In Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Product, it was argued that any 
exception that entirely removes the right to exclude making and using the patented 
product is not considered a ‘limited exception’. 92  Yet another interpretation 
minimally reduces the legal rights of the patentee and allows for a generic 
manufacturer to produce a limited quantity of patented drugs to submit to a national 
regulatory review process. As it could take generic producers several years to 
develop the generic product and to obtain regulatory approval, permitting these 
activities during the course of the patent could significantly reduce the length of time 
that the patent owner would enjoy a monopoly in the market and thereby reduce their 
profits. In particular, pharmaceuticals are subject to rigorous government scrutiny 
due to their potential to cause serious harm to human health through unintended side 
effects. Patent owners cannot claim a ‘legitimate interest’ in the economic benefits 
caused by the length of time required to get regulatory approval for generic drugs.93 
In this way, Art.30 seems to open an avenue to reduce protection for pharmaceuticals 
as it states that limited exceptions apply if they do not conflict with the normal use of 
the patent or are prejudicial against the legitimate interests of the patent owner.  
This exception has been given limited scope in WTO disputes and it is doubtful that 
a refusal to patent a particular drug or to enforce exclusive rights to sell during the 
mandatory period of the patent could be viewed as a ‘limited exception’. At present, 
few developing nations relied on Art.30 but have instead turned to compulsory 
licensing in Art.31.to deal with the lack of access issue. 
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Art.31 - Compulsory Licensing 
A compulsory license is a license granted to a third party, without the consent of the 
patent holder, to make, use or sell the patented product.94 WTO member countries 
are able to override a patent by authorizing a compulsory license for production of a 
drug on public health grounds to authorize production of patented drugs, subject to 
adequate compensation to the patent holders.
 
Although the grounds upon which 
compulsory licenses can be granted are not limited by TRIPS, is not explicitly 
addressed by TRIPS although it does mention national emergencies, other 
circumstances of extreme urgency, and anti-competitive practices as possible 
grounds for compulsory licensing.95 Overall, it appears that countries seeking to use 
compulsory licensing have a fair bit of discretion at their disposal, something that has 
been a source of major concern for pharmaceutical companies and other supporters 
of strong intellectual property rights. 
Governments can also use compulsory licenses to curtail excessive prices and to 
increase domestic production or importation of pharmaceuticals, which is highly 
relevant in the context of lack of access to medicines. However, there are significant 
obstacles for developing countries in being able to grant compulsory licenses either 
for domestic production or for parallel importation.
 
To make effective use of a 
compulsory license for domestic production, a country must possess both a 
reasonably sophisticated pharmaceutical industry to produce medicine and a 
sufficient manufacturing capacity to create economies of scale to keep the costs 
down and the price of the medicine affordable. 96
 
With regards to a compulsory 
license for importation, the country must be able to import the pharmaceuticals at an 
affordable price in the quantity and quality required. Many developing countries are 
unable to fully utilize compulsory licenses either because they do not have sufficient 
manufacturing capacity or because a potential importer is prohibited from 
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manufacturing and exporting the drug from a member country with sufficient 
manufacturing capacity.
 
Art.5 of Doha confirms that WTO Member States have the 
freedom to determine the grounds for compulsory licensing and that public health 
crises, including HIV and other diseases, can represent a national emergency or other 
circumstance of extreme urgency.97 After Doha, several compulsory licenses were 
issued for generic manufacture of patented pharmaceuticals.
 
Countries like Thailand, 
developed an express strategy of using compulsory licensing to reduce health-care 
costs.
  
Art.31(f) has constrained countries that do have manufacturing capacity in their 
ability to provide assistance because it requires that manufacture under compulsory 
licensing be predominantly for supply of the domestic market, even when the licence 
is issued for a national emergency or other circumstance of extreme urgency or for 
public, non-commercial use. 
This restriction on the use of compulsory licenses for importation is even more 
significant as many developing member countries like India. Until 2005, India was 
able to export huge quantities of generic drugs because its domestic patent laws were 
not TRIPS compliant.
 
Although it has the sufficient manufacturing capacity, it is 
now more limited in its ability to export medicines to other developing and LDCs, 
which do not have sufficient manufacturing capacity to produce life-saving 
medicines. Yet the smart moves made by India has enabled it to rise amongst the 
other developing countries and to reap the benefits of TRIPS.  
This problem was recognized in Doha negotiations and resulted in the adoption of 
the Paragraph 6 Implementation Decision (“the Implementation Decision”), an 
agreement to waive reliance on Art.31(f) was adopted along with the Protocol 
Amending the TRIPS Agreement (“the Protocol”).98 In essence, the Implementation 
Decision and the Protocol allowed countries with manufacturing capacity to adopt 
legislation that permit the granting of compulsory licenses for the production of 
pharmaceuticals for export, and countries that lack manufacturing capacity to 
introduce equivalent legislation to facilitate import. However, both instruments 
impose stringent conditions on the terms of the implementing legislation and to date, 
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there is little to suggest that they contribute to reversing the failure of the 
industrialized world to supply essential medicines to the countries that need them the 
most.99 There does not appear to be widespread enthusiasm for using Implementation 
Decision and Protocol mechanisms to facilitate the provision of low-cost or no-cost 
pharmaceuticals to those most in need. Few countries have implemented the Protocol 
and only Rwanda has used the system to import antiretrovirals (ARVs) from Canada. 
It seems that the Implementation Decision was never intended to deliver medicines at 
affordable prices, but rather, to ensure that countries lacking manufacturing capacity 
in the pharmaceutical sector could benefit from the TRIPS compulsory licensing 
regime.  
Article 27 
Another provision that may afford developing nations an opportunity to lower 
pharmaceutical prices relates to an important qualification on the exclusive right to 
import under Art.27 with reference to Art.6. Art.6 is an obscurely worded provision 
that questions whether a patent holder retains his rights over the resale of a product 
once it has been introduced into the stream of commerce or if he has exhausted it 
after the initial sale.100 If his rights are exhausted, a patent holder loses his ability to 
price discriminate across markets and there may be undercutting of the desired price 
of his product in a particular market. However, developing countries that face 
relatively high prices for a particular drug when it is sold directly into its market by a 
patent holder may be able to ameliorate the problem by importing the drug from 
another country where a lower price is charged.  
4. Effects of Other International Agreements: TRIPS-Plus 
There should also be attention brought to the issue of TRIPS-plus and how this form 
of increased protection is not justified in developing countries where there are weak 
scientific and technological infrastructures and where a majority of the population is 
poor.101 However, the rising occurrence of bilateral agreements that focused on the 
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adoption of high protection of intellectual-property rights entered into by developing 
countries in order to create a favorable climate for foreign direct investment. The 
impetus behind changes in intellectual property rights is observed to be the need to 
pay for trade concessions102 and this has led to the immediate effect of preventing 
access to medicines. This suggests that the problem of access is not solely due to 
strong patent protection but as a result of developing countries’ own actions in a bid 
to attain significant economic growth.  
Currently, developing countries are not making full use of flexibilities built in to 
TRIPS Agreement to overcome patent barriers, such as compulsory licenses and 
parallel imports as advocated by the Doha.103 The main reason is possibly due to the 
absence of domestic resources and capacity, resulting in dependency on donor 
financing and in turn constraining the ability to exploit international trade provisions. 
Similarly, inequalities in power and influence between countries leave many 
vulnerable to pressure to protect broad trade and economic interests. In addition, 
widespread misunderstandings also exist, such as the misconception that countries 
have to declare a national emergency before invoking a compulsory license.104  
 
PART IV – THE EFFECTS AND RESPONSES OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY: CASE STUDY OF INDIA 
 
India is an example of a less developed country that has embraced the international 
landscape relating to pharmaceutical patents. It is relatively better off than other less 
developed countries due to the effective steps adopted by the government in setting 
up a reasonably well-developed pharmaceutical sector.  Previously, the lack of patent 
protection in India made it unprofitable to develop better cures for diseases as any 
invention was readily copied and the original inventor was unable to recover research 
costs. India’s patent laws had to undergo major changes to comply with product 
patent requirements on pharmaceuticals in TRIPS but the heightened patent 
protection is observed to drive Indian firms to undertake research in finding cures for 
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diseases common in the society. Although there has been controversial debate 
regarding the effects of TRIPS on less developed countries, India displays the 
possibility that such nations can benefit from the international agreement if the right 
policies and laws are implemented.  
 
(a) History of the Patent System in India 
 
Protectionism has shaped the patent legislation in India. Before gaining 
independence in 1947, India was an English Colony that held patent laws based upon 
those of England. 105  The first act relating to patent rights passed in 1856 was 
replaced by the Indian Patents and Design Act of 1911 when the newly independent 
nation sought to revamp the inherited British system to bring it into alignment with 
its rapidly transforming and dynamic industrial economy.106 During that time, the 
system was being exploited by foreigners to achieve monopolistic control over the 
market in vital industries like pharmaceuticals. Indian drug prices were among the 
highest in the world and arguably unaffordable to the general populace.107 In a bid to 
reduce foreign control and to protect national interests, the Patents Act of 1970 (“the 
Act”) was passed by the Indian parliament. Ironically, it is essentially "a copy of the 
English Patent Act of 1949” with much less patent protection.108 
The objectives of the Act were to spur the development of a strong domestic 
pharmaceutical industry and to ensure the provision of affordable medicine for 
Indian consumers. Under the Act, India only recognized process patents over a 7-
year period and deliberately disallowed product patents to prevent monopoly control 
of items like medicine.109 India found that the share of multinational pharmaceutical 
firms gradually declined to about 40% in 1999 and Indian companies eventually 
gained 85% percent of the bulk drugs market. In addition, policies consistent with 
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the Act’s objectives were introduced, including drug price controls, restrictions on 
capacity expansion and limits on multinational equity shares that have both kept 
pharmaceutical prices low and encouraged the development of the Indian 
pharmaceutical industry.  
While pharmaceuticals themselves could not be patented, the process patents 
covering methods of their manufacture allowed for ‘reverse engineering’ by Indian 
companies where they could reproduce and market newly invented drugs in the 
Indian market through different production processes at only a small fraction of cost 
of patented drugs in developed countries.110 Since then, many Indian drug companies 
have emerged as leaders in the pharmaceutical industry because of their low costs. 
The price controls imposed by the government and stiff competition between Indian 
pharmaceutical firms offered medicine at low prices, benefiting the locals, especially 
the poorer sections of the society.  
However, the liberalization era in 1991 affected the Indian pharmaceutical industry 
and led to the introduction of the ‘New Drug Policy’ that progressively reduced 
drugs under price control in 1994.111 Around the same time, India also signed TRIPs 
and was subjected to the minimum standards regarding patents for pharmaceuticals. 
India introduced the Patents (Amendment) Act 1999, which paved the way for 
stronger patent rights in the country.112 Under TRIPS, the patent term increased to 20 
years and patent owners are granted the exclusive right to prevent others from 
making, using, selling or importing the invented product or process in India.  
In keeping with its commitments under TRIPs, a new set of provisions have been 
added to permit pre-market testing of generics during the patent term to enable them 
to be marketed immediately upon expiration of the patent. This pro-patent shift 
culminated in India's accession to the Paris Convention and its subsidiary, the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty in December 1998. Finally, product patents were introduced for 
pharmaceuticals under the enactment of the Patents (Third Amendment) Act, 2005. 
The amendments included a statement omitting the use of ‘reverse engineering’ and 
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Indian firms could no longer survive on that basis and the pharmaceutical industry 
once again began to face competition from multinational corporations.113  
To restrict the number and type of pharmaceutical patents, India introduced Section 
3(d), which prohibits patents on variants of existing compounds that do not show 
enhanced efficacy. Despite being extremely contentious as the transnational 
pharmaceutical industry and the US-India Business Council regard it as establishing 
an unacceptably high barrier to patenting, this section is defended by many 
observers, including the United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS on the grounds 
that it displays India as a model for developing countries attempting to use TRIPS 
flexibilities to promote public health.114 
(b) Fighting Patent Wars: The Success Story India’s Pharmaceutical Industry 
Over the years, the Indian pharmaceutical sector has witnessed rapid growth and 
transformation to a point where it is now the world’s largest producer of 
formulations in terms of volume and one of the world’s largest producers of bulk 
drugs. Its commendable 17% annual growth rate115 can be attributed to the flexible 
provisions of the 2005 Patent Act and other supportive policies of the government 
that have played an instrumental role in the development of the industry.  
Up until the 1970s, India’s pharmaceuticals were mainly supplied by large 
international corporations. However, the sector’s growth was built upon the 
production of cheap bulk drugs by the state-owned companies under the assistance of 
the WHO. The decline of state-run companies began in the 1980s because of 
increasing central government bureaucracy and insufficient corporate governance. 
Today, no entirely state-owned pharmaceutical companies exist. By contrast, the 
weakening of the patent system and numerous protectionist measures sped up the 
development of a major national pharmaceutical industry on a private sector basis, 
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making it possible to provide the population with a large number of drugs.  
Previously dominated by multinational subsidiaries, Indian-owned firms become 
leading players and major exporters by 2001, gaining international recognition as a 
manufacturer of pharmaceuticals. 116  Between 1996 and 2006, nominal sales of 
pharmaceuticals were up 9% per annum and expanded much faster than the global 
pharmaceutical market as a whole.117 Since the end of the 1980s, India has been 
exporting more pharmaceuticals than it imports. Over the last 10 years, the export 
surplus widened to EUR 2 billion and will likely continue to rise further in the 
coming years.118 As production location, the country is benefiting from its wage cost 
advantages over western competitors when it comes to producing medicines.   
The wave of globalization and the liberalization policy of the government have 
opened up new opportunities for the industry and large numbers of firms are also 
competing at the global level. Pharmaceutical exports are destined for around 175 
countries, which include the lower regulated markets of Sri-Lanka and African 
countries. 119 However, the bulk of India’s export of pharmaceutical products are 
however, destined toward the US and other European nations. This shows the 
relative strength of Indian pharmaceutical firms in producing high quality generic 
products. 
Legal changes in India made it considerably more difficult to produce generic 
versions of drugs. Indian companies can no longer simply copy medicines with 
foreign patents by using alternative manufacturing processes and offer them on the 
domestic market. A reorientation in India’s pharmaceutical industry has seen a shift 
towards a focus on drugs developed in-house and contract research or production for 
western drug makers. India took advantage of the compulsory licensing flexibility in 
TRIPS to ameliorate potentially negative effects that pharmaceutical patents might 
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have on the supply of medicines.120 Domestic companies began producing imitations 
of patented products and could eventually formulate better processes for the same 
product. However, compulsory licensing potentially discourages commercial R&D 
necessary to develop new drugs to fight global epidemic and can also be used to seek 
price levels below what a given national market is capable of supporting. In this way, 
it further concentrates the burden of financing pharmaceutical innovation on 
developed country consumers and discourages the development of drugs targeted at 
the disease burdens of countries using such licenses.  
Essentially, India uses patents to develop commercial pharmaceutical industries that 
produce products directed at local diseases and available at price that patients in 
those countries can afford. These efforts are supported by foundations and non-profit 
organizations such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and One World Health 
and highly suggest that developing countries have the capacity to build research-
intensive pharmaceutical industries capable of operating profitably in the conditions 
of the local market. However, for such local industries to take root and grow, 
effective patent protection must be made available, the commercialization of publicly 
funded research must be encouraged, and compulsory licensing must be kept to a 
minimum.121  
Life-saving drugs demonstrate incredible medical advances that can be achieved 
through R&D. As such, they do not come cheaply and are often unaffordable to 
patients as pharmaceutical companies expect high returns from their successful drugs 
and rely on profits generated through patents to recoup the sunk costs of R&D.  
In an effort to make essential medicines more affordable to the people, India has 
worked within its domestic patent laws to mount oppositions to patent applications 
by pharmaceutical giants. Advocates such as the Indian Network for People Living 
With HIV/AIDS and UNITAID have also sought to negotiate lower prices for 
ARVs.122 Yet, despite these achievements, medications remain out of financial reach 
to those who need them most. Although the effects of pharmaceutical patents under 
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TRIPS cannot be fully prevented, it is possible to press for a judicious application of 
the new laws with public health priorities in mind.  
Decisions by the Indian Courts 
Recent rulings by Indian Courts have changed the rules of the game, forcing several 
pharmaceutical giants to put health interests before profits. India previously did not 
award any patents at all and gave generic drug companies free licenses to copy 
essential drugs at affordable prices. 123  However, the enforcement of TRIPS 
effectively handed multinational companies patents in all markets. Yet, numerous 
western pharmaceutical companies have struggled to patent their drugs in India and 
have vigorously argued against the decisions of Indian courts.  
 
The Novartis Case: 
The Glivec case raises important issues that are essential to the future of intellectual 
property law and the innovative pharmaceutical business in India. After a tedious 6-
year battle, the Indian Supreme Court ruled against Swiss pharmaceutical giant 
Novartis and decided that its altered leukaemia drug, Glivec, did not deserve a new 
patent. It was found to be a clear case of “evergreening” by Novartis, a process 
whereby the company makes minor alterations to existing drugs in order to secure a 
new patent and to extend its monopoly.124 The engagement in this process is a global 
trend as several pharmaceutical companies argue that without recognition of 
incremental innovation, pharmaceutical companies will lose the incentive to invest in 
R&D of patented drugs and that patients will be denied new and better medicines.125 
Although breakthrough innovations are important, they are rare and hence, it is 
through incremental innovations that many important advances are made. 126  
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Incremental innovation is seen as a major means for improving medicines in the 
industry as it provides benefits beyond enhanced efficacy in terms of patient safety 
and compliance, manufacturing efficacy, product stability during storage and 
transport and new formulations of the product aimed at specific patient groups.127 On 
the other hand, compulsory licenses withdraw a patent from a drug company if it is 
deemed prohibitively expensive to a domestic market and a vital public health need. 
Additionally, it is argued that without strong patent protection, the Indian 
pharmaceutical industry will be unable to transform from a generic leader into an 
innovator.  
Novartis India’s managing director Ranjit Shahani argued that the decision 
discourages innovative drug discovery essential to advancing medical science for 
patients and is a setback for patients.128 John Castellani, chief executive of US trade 
organisation PhRMA, also expressed his dismay as he felt that the protection of 
intellectual property is fundamental to the discovery of new medicines. He opined 
that it is critically important that India promote a policy environment that supports 
continued R&D of new medicines for the health of patients locally and globally, in 
order to solve the real health challenges. 129  On the other hand, the decision is 
welcomed by humanitarian organisations like Médicins Sans Frontières (MSF), 
which said that the decision is a ‘major victory’ for patient access to affordable 
medicines.  
 
The ability to rely on patents in India benefits government, industry and patients 
alike because research-based organizations will know if investing in the development 
of better medicines for patients in India is a viable and sustainable long-term option. 
For pharmaceutical companies, the real issue is the R&D costs associated with drug 
creation. Novartis stated that "only one out of 10,000 experimental compounds in 
development will reach the marketplace”.130 Thus each successful product needs to 
cover the costs used to make the other failed products. Without patents, investment 
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in R&D will plummet as foreign investors are less attracted to invest in an 
environment where they will not be able to recover their losses in. Simply put, weak 
patent protection leads to insufficient discoveries of new medicines and the lack of 
new generics for untreated diseases. 
 
As mentioned, Section 3(d) of the Act, which bars patents on drugs that are not 
deemed to be sufficiently novel, is at the heart of discussions questioning India’s 
compliance with TRIPS. Due to its vague and potentially limited meaning, 
pharmaceutical companies like Novartis rely on this section to challenge the 
rejection of its patent applications by Indian Courts by arguing that it is contrary to 
both Indian law and TRIPS standards. According to this provision, a known drug 
cannot be patented unless the ‘known efficacy’ for a substance has been enhanced.131 
However, the Act does not provide any test or guidelines for determining this 
enhanced efficacy. One of the primary purposes was for preventing evergreening of a 
patent. India has used the “enhanced efficacy” concept to differentiate genuine 
innovation from evergreening. Despite strong arguments against India’s current 
interpretation of section 3(d), India’s treatment of patent applications is unlikely to 
change unless Switzerland complains successfully to the WTO.  
 
Pharmaceutical patent advocates argue that the outcome of the case will not hinder 
the supply of essential medicines because of the presence of safeguards in TRIPS. 
Although the Novartis case does not challenge these safeguards, pharmaceutical 
companies claim that even with those safeguards in place and 98% of the WHO 
essential drugs available at off-patent prices, more than a third of the world 
population still lacks access due to political, economic and logistical barriers.132  
 
Furthermore, currently available generic drugs launched in India before 2005 such as 
generic versions of Glivec will continue to be available regardless of the legal 
outcome of the case. Novartis strongly supports the contribution of generics to 
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improving public health once drug patents expire, but also recognizes that many 
patients need further assistance to gain access to the medicines they need. It has set 
up the Glivec International Patient Assistance Program (“GIPAP”) that is currently 
helping more than 31,000 patients in 80 countries and more than 16,000 patients in 
India receive Glivec free of charge.133 Since it began in 2002, more than 37,000 
patients have been helped through GIPAP. 134  Novartis has also designed an 
expanded new access program, Novartis Oncology Access (NOA) that provides 
access to eligible Glivec patients in India.  
 
India has revoked, or denied in one form or another, multiple drug patents, which lets 
Indian companies produce cheaper, generic versions for sale in the South Asian 
nation. While many of these brand-name drugs would be too expensive to sell in big 
numbers in a developing country such as India, pharmaceutical companies and US 
officials say they never could have been developed without American investment 
and research. Given India’s role as an economic leader among emerging countries, 
there is concern that India’s strict patent policies may have a spillover effect to other 
countries. India’s approach, while lucrative for some of its big businesses, may end 
up doing more harm than good to its people and its overall economy. Foreign 
investment is beginning to dry up as seen through the drop in foreign direct 
investment from $35 billion in 2011 to $22.4 billion in 2013.135  
 
However, it is unlikely that the Novartis decision will curb investment in India. 
Firstly, firms have approached India with caution since the 1970s and although the 
recent Novartis case justifies such cautious attitudes, it also signals to firms the 
direction in which India plans to take its new patent law. With this knowledge, 
pharmaceutical companies will be able to tailor their investments to maximize the 
benefit they can extract from India while minimizing their risk.  
 
It is important to view India in the context of its past patent history. When the Indian 
Patent Act was amended in 1970, many foreign companies left due to the lack of 
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patent protection. Following the 2005 changes to patent law, companies are once 
again considering India as a viable option for investment. Although the Novartis case 
have kept investors cautious, many drug makers have formed research-based 
partnerships with Indian companies. For instance, the pharmaceutical giant, 
GlaxoSmithKline has recently teamed up with a local Indian company Ranbaxy to 
conduct early-stage drug development.136 In fact, GSK has consistently increased the 
number of clinical studies it has conducted in India, going from 3 leading up to 2005 
to sixteen in 2006, to approximately 31 in 2007.  
 
India’s workforce is perhaps its greatest asset in attracting foreign pharmaceutical 
investment. It has a large number of English speaking engineers and scientists who 
are willing to work for relatively low wages. Also, investors can look into India’s 
thriving generics industry to provide well-educated workers with highly relevant 
experience. The new patent laws will encourage firms to utilize India’s educated 
workforce as the skills and process knowledge required is directly applicable to the 
discovery process.  
 
The Novartis case presented the Indian Court with an opportunity to defy the cultural 
and political trends toward weak patent protection. Instead of paving the way for a 
new era of strong patent protection, the Court maintained the Indian tradition of 
protectionism. Despite the controversy surrounding section 3(d), it is unlikely that 
the WTO would find India in violation of TRIPS because of the wide discretion 
given to member countries by the language of TRIPS.  
 
(c) Bending the Rules: Making the Best of TRIPS Flexibilities  
 
In March 2012, India’s Intellectual Property Appellate Board upheld the country’s 
first compulsory license to an Indian generic drug manufacturer, Natco Pharma Ltd., 
to make cheaper versions of German pharmaceutical company Bayer Corporation’s 
drug, Nexavar.137 Seeing that Bayer took no adequate or reasonable steps to the drug 
accessible the Indian people, Natco applied for a compulsory license. Bayer argued 
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that it could not maximize the distribution of the drug in the country as another 
pharmaceutical company, Cipla, is selling a similar drug. According to the decision, 
Natco must pay a quarterly royalty at 6% of the net sales of the drug, lower than 
Bayer’s asking royalty of 15% of net sales.138 The royalty of 6% is in line with the 
United Nations Development Program recommendation of a 4% royalty. Under the 
terms of the compulsory license, Natco shall provide the drug for free to at least 600 
needy and deserving patients every year, sell the drug at no more than 8,880 Indian 
rupees (US$178) for 120 tablets and is prohibited from outsourcing the 
manufacturing of the drug. MSF opines that the ruling ends Bayer’s monopoly in 
India on the drug and could set precedent for making more expensive patented drugs 
available for compulsory licensing.139 This incidence offers hope to the possibility of 
patented new drugs being produced by generic makers at a fraction of the original 
price with royalties being paid to the patent holder. This compensates patent holders 
while at the same time ensures that competition can bring down prices.  
 
Another health concern in India is that drug companies in the West have no incentive 
to develop treatments for many of the health problems that affect India. Diseases like 
malaria and leprosy are not major concerns in the West, so pharmaceutical 
companies lack an incentive to research possible cures. If a Western drug company 
does not invent a treatment, Indian companies, while adept at copying, will not have 
the capability to invent the drugs.  
Indian pharmaceutical companies have begun trying to build technology muscle. A 
prime example is Ranbaxy Lab Incorporated which signed a $90 million joint 
venture with Eli Lilly & Co. to collaborate for drug research and development. In 
recognizing the problems with its patent system, India is attempting to modernize 
and join the developed world.140 
Other signs of change can be observed from the establishment of an aggressive 
program to commercialize the research of the scientists working in its laboratories by 
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the Indian Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR).141 This program 
involves identifying useful inventions and patenting them not only in India, but in 
big markets like the United States as well. From 1991 to 2002, CISR received a 
substantial increase in the number of patents from the United States Patent & 
Trademark Office.142 Many of these patents involve pharmaceutical products arising 
out of research based on traditional knowledge and the local ecosystem of India. One 
of the most successful examples is Asmon, a polyherbal medication for the relief of 
bronchial asthma.143 The product is now on the market in India and is available to 
asthma sufferers in that country at a price they can afford.   
2. Stepping up: Efforts by External Groups 
 
Indian Generic Manufacturers 
 
In addition to the pharmaceutical companies’ duty to supply, there is also hope that 
generic drug manufacturing companies in developing countries will assume some of 
this responsibility to supply essential medicines and will invest more in R&D instead 
of simple reverse engineering. This will allow developing country drug 
manufacturers to develop original low cost medicines on their own. Indian 
companies such as Cipla, one of India's largest generic drug manufacturers, has 
already begun assuming some of this responsibility by taking advantage of the fact 
that they are able to make a variety of different drugs from many competing 
pharmaceutical companies.144 These companies combine various ARVs into a one-a-
day, easy-to-take fixed dose combinations that would be very difficult to 
manufacture in developed countries due to patent protection, but that are essential to 
HIV-AIDS treatment in developing countries due to their simplicity. Therefore, such 
efforts have significantly improved the access to essential medicines in developing 
countries to individuals suffering from HIV-AIDS.  
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Cipla has also cut the price on its cancer medicines by up to 75%, a move likely to 
further complicate efforts by big Western pharmaceutical companies seeking to 
develop their businesses in India.145 Its decision to slash prices comes only weeks 
after India's patent authority forced Germany's Bayer AG to grant a license to 
another Indian generic drug producer for its kidney and liver cancer medicine, 
Nexavar. 
As compared to Bayer's patented Nexavar at 280,000 rupees (US$5,234) a month, 
Cipla is offering its generic version at a much cheaper price of 6,840 rupees 
(US$128) a month.146 Y. K. Hamied, Cipla's chairman and managing director, cast 
the move as an attempt to bring cheap cancer medicines to the world, just as the 
company became a champion of HIV patients in Africa a decade ago by using its 
cheaper manufacturing base to sell AIDS drugs at a deep discount.147 
 
Foreign companies are likely to be concerned that medicine prices could fall further 
in India if patent offices and local courts continue to challenge patents recognized 
elsewhere. Other countries in the past have forced foreign drug companies to issue 
licenses for drugs patented elsewhere. In 2007, Thailand revoked a patent for U.S. 
firm Abbott Laboratories blockbuster AIDS medicine to allow generic producers to 
make cheaper versions.148 
Big pharmaceutical companies want to sell in India, a country of 1.2 billion people 
with an economy growing at over 6% per year. But these companies argue that – 
unlike generics producers, who typically copy drugs that come off patent – they need 
intellectual-property protection to fund the high cost of research. The drug industry 
says new medicines can take a decade and cost more than $1 billion to develop.149 
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Richard Bergstrom, director general of the European Federation of Pharmaceutical 
Industries and Associations, said that compulsory licenses should only be the ‘last 
resort’ and that India should seek other ways to work with foreign companies to get 
the drug to poor people.150 Many foreign producers have pushed tiered-pricing, in 
which they offer the drug at different costs depending on a country's level of 
development. 
India has declined to defend patents on a number of occasions previously, 
contending that the Indian system fosters a competitive environment that keeps 
prices low so that the country's vast and mostly poor population can afford 
medicines. 
3. Other developments: South Africa and Brazil 
 
South Africa: The trade dispute in South Africa in 1998 is a matter that has shaped 
the debate on TRIPS and access to medicines. In that case, the South African 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association and 40 mostly multinational 
pharmaceutical manufacturers, brought a suit against the government of South 
Africa, alleging that the Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act 
No. 90 of 1997 violated TRIPS and the South African constitution.151  
 
The Amendment Act introduces a legal framework to increase the availability of 
affordable medicines in South Africa and includes provisions regarding the generic 
substitution of off-patent medicines, transparent pricing for all medicines, and the 
parallel importation of patented medicines. 
 
The United States, where Big Pharma is from, had put pressure on South Africa by 
withholding trade benefits and threatening further trade sanctions, aiming to force the 
South African government to repeal the amendments. Outrage and strong demands 
from demonstrators and several governments around the world caused the 
pharmaceutical companies involved to withdraw from the case. The case brought out 
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two key issues into the international arena. 152  Firstly, the interpretation of the 
flexibilities in TRIPS and their use for public health purposes needed clarification to 
ensure that developing countries could use its provisions without the threat of legal 
or political challenge. Secondly, it became clear that industrialized countries that 
exercised trade pressures to defend the interest of their multinational industries could 
no longer exert pressure withput repercussions from the wider international 
community.  
 
Brazil: Since the 1990s, Brazil has offered comprehensive AIDS case, including 
universal access to AVR treatment. On an estimate, it is purported that close to 
600,000 people are suffering from HIV in Brazil but only half of the cases are 
reported to the Ministry of Health. 153  Brazil has set up the Brazilian AIDS 
programme that has assisted in reducing AIDS-related mortality by more than 50% 
and the country has also saved US$472 million in hospital and treatment costs under 
this initiative.154 
 
At the core of the success of this programme is Brazil’s ability to produce medicines 
locally, just like India. It has also managed to negotiate lower prices for patented 
drugs by using the threat of production under a compulsory license as allowed for 
under Article 68 of the Brazilian patent law. However, the US took action against 
Brazil at the WTO Dispute Settlement Body over Article 68 and argued that the 
Brazilian law discriminated against the US owners of Brazilian patents, that it 
curtailed patent holders’ rights and violated certain articles in TRIPS.155 The US 
action came under fierce pressure from the international Non-Governmental 
Organisation (“NGO”) community. Brazil has been vocal internationally in the 
debates on access to medicines and has offered support to developing countries to 
help them increase manufacturing capacity by the transfer of technology and 
knowledge. Hence, the NGO community feared that the US action would have a 
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detrimental effect on Brazil’s successful AIDS programme and that this would in 
turn negatively impact on other countries that receive assistance from Brazil.  
 
The Brazilian AIDS programme serves as a model for some developing countries for 
the production of generic ARV drugs. In addition to the success story of India, it is 
also shown that other developing countries like Brazil do not have to bear the brunt 
of strong patent protection under international agreements. It is possible for them to 
benefit from the changes in the international landscape and at the same time, offer a 
helping hand to other developing countries in adapting to the changing environment.  
 
8. Actions of Global Players 
 
Many international institutions and UN agencies have also contributed to the debate 
on the access to medicines and looked into the consequences of stronger intellectual 
property protection as a result of TRIPS for developing countries.  
 
The public health community first raised concerns about the consequences of 
globalization and international trade agreements with respect to drug access during 
the 1996 World Health Assembly. A resolution on the Revised Drug Strategy (RDS), 
which set out the World Health Organization (“WHO”) medicines policy requested 
the WHO to report on the actions of the WTO with respect to national drug policies 
and essential drugs.156 The resolution gave the WHO the mandate to publish the first 
guide with recommendations to Member States for implementing TRIPS while 
limiting the negative effects of higher patent protection on drug availability. 
 
At that time, the WHO’s involvement in trade issues was highly controversial. The 
emphasis on public health needs over trade interests was seen as a threat to the 
commercial sector of the industrialized world. However, the US and some European 
countries unsuccessfully pressured the WHO in an attempt to prevent the publication 
of the guide.157  The WHO subsequently adopted two resolutions that addressed the 
need to strengthen policies to increase the availability of generic drugs and the need 
to evaluate the impact of TRIPS on access to drugs. At present, the WHO’s work 
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programme on pharmaceuticals and trade includes provisions of policy guidance and 
information on intellectual property and health to countries for monitoring and 
analyzing the effects of TRIPS.  
 
In 2001, the EU also adopted the Programme for Action, which accelerates action on 
diseases such as HIV/AIDS and malaria in the context of poverty reduction. The EU 
programme recognized the potential problem of TRIPS and the need to rebalance its 
priorities with a shift towards a more pro-public health approach to TRIPS.158 In 
acknowledging the concerns of developing countries, European company, DG Trade 
dropped its objections to the use of compulsory licensing to overcome patent barriers 
to medicine access and became an advocate for a global tiered pricing system for 
pharmaceuticals.  
 
PART V: ADVOCATING A MULTI-LAYERED SYSTEM 
 
A potential and viable solution to attaining harmonization between the 
pharmaceutical industry and the public health request exists as shown by success 
stories of developing countries like India in adapting to strong patent protection 
requirements under TRIPS. Despite controversial arguments against pharmaceutical 
patents, there is an intricate connection between the promotion of public health and 
promotion of pharmaceutical inventions. Patents are a critical component in the 
development of new drugs for treatment of the world’s health as they provide great 
incentives to the pharmaceutical industry to engage in R&D and production of new 
medicines. However, it is necessary to take measures to prevent the abuse of patent 
protection by pharmaceutical companies that attempt to secure a monopoly and set 
drug prices at a level that is way out of reach of patients.   
 
A balance between medical innovation and public affordability can be achieved 
through the development of realistic and practical solutions offered by both the 
pharmaceutical industry and public interest groups. This calls for the development of 
a multi-layered system that may include stricter patent approval procedures, the use 
of patent pools, more extensive use of TRIPS flexibilities such as compulsory 
licensing, the promotion of regionally produced drugs and state compensation from 
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developing countries to medical companies in developed countries. The effectiveness 
of some of these components has already been assessed in earlier parts of the paper 
and they have shown to produce positive results in the real world. It is necessary to 
further promote these existing efforts and to inculcate new ones on a broader and 
more comprehensive scale in order to solve the lack of access problem that is 
plaguing the world.  
 
TRIPS has significantly shaped the landscape for pharmaceutical patents and made 
great impact upon the availability of affordable medicines that has threatened a 
possible violation of the right to health. It is important that the open-textured 
language of the provisions is interpreted in a manner that reflects the need to place 
the public interests ahead of the economic pursuits of pharmaceutical companies.159 
A proper treaty interpretation helps by possibly eliminating reducing or providing 
mechanisms to resolve seeming conflict between them.  
 
Like India, many developing countries possess the capacity and capabilities to build 
robust and profitable pharmaceutical industries that provide products directed to the 
diseases common to their own nationals and that can be supported by the local 
market. However, for such local industries to be established, it is imperative to have 
effective patent protection, the commercialization of publicly funded research, and 
the minimal use compulsory licensing. This development process can be assisted by 
wealthy developed through subsidies on the local markets for the purchase of drugs 
through the Global Fund and other direct assistance programmes.160 Consumers in all 
countries can then share the burden of drug development equitably and pay for 
medicine at a price level that is within their means. 
 
The future the role of public agencies and private players in delivering healthcare 
should also be defined more clearly. Pharmaceutical companies can take steps to 
alter their policies or adopt a more accommodating system towards public 
affordability whereby a sustainable profit-making business may co-exist with the 
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effective and affordable provision of medicines to the poor. To ensure sustainable 
success, corporate responsibility activities have to be professionally managed, with 
clearly defined objectives, cost-effectiveness, performance monitoring and 
accountability, as well as transparent communication.161  
 
There is presently insufficient research done for the development of medicines 
needed to treat tropical diseases due to the lack of incentives for pharmaceutical 
companies. In order to increase the strength of these incentives, action by the local 
governments and pharmaceutical companies themselves, are crucial. Firstly, there 
should be a uniform public policy that recognizes the need for drug discovery along 
with modification of anti-trust laws that impede collaboration between the US 
companies. Instead, companies should be encouraged to work together on 
humanitarian projects. Last summer, the Director General of WHO spoke at a 
Conference on Pharmaceuticals for Developing Countries and encouraged the 
pharmaceutical industry to focus more attention on the development of drugs for 
diseases of developing nations. 
Developing and delivering appropriate, affordable, well-adapted medicines remains 
an urgent challenge but there have been significant developments by public interest 
groups to counter the effects of strong patent protection. In July 2008, the UNITAID 
Executive Board approved the plan to create a patent pool to increase the access to 
more appropriate and affordable medicines to patients in developing countries. The 
pool is intended to avert a ‘tragedy of the anti-commons’ in which people are unable 
to make use of knowledge because of the tangle of property rights that can block 
them.162  
The Patent Pool Initiative established by UNITAID is the first medicines patent pool 
and it aims to help solve world health problems through an innovative initiative for 
the collective management of intellectual property rights by establishing a patent 
pool for HIV medicines. The idea behind a patent pool is to facilitate the availability 
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of new technologies by making patents and other forms of intellectual property of 
pharmaceutical companies and governments.163 These bodies voluntarily offer the 
intellectual property related to their inventions to the patent pool and any company 
that wants to use the property to produce or develop medicines for developing 
countries can seek a license from the pool and pay royalties to produce medicines for 
developing countries listed by the World Bank.164 The success of the patent pool 
largely depends on the willingness of pharmaceutical companies to participate and 
commit their intellectual property to the pool.  
 
The pool will help to speed up the availability of lower priced, newer medicines 
because there will be no need to wait out the patent term of 20 years, a substantial 
period of time that patients cannot afford to lose. In exchange for the payment of 
royalties to the patent owners through the pool, any producer would be allowed to 
manufacture the patented medicines and sell them in countries well before the 
expiration of the patent term. With licenses covering both low and middle-income 
countries, the geographical scope of the market would be attractively large, thereby 
encouraging multiple generic producers to come forward and access the patents. In 
order to maintain competitiveness, producers will reduce the prices of medicines, 
making them more affordable to the people. 
The pool has the potential to provide benefits not only to pharmaceutical companies 
when they are rewarded for their investments into R&D but also to generic 
companies are able to access the intellectual property more easily and quickly and 
patients in developing countries get faster access to better and more affordable 
treatments. Gilead is the first pharmaceutical company to agree to put specific drug 
patents in the pool.165 This will allow generic companies in India to make cheap 
copies of them for use in poor countries with major Aids epidemics. Even more 
importantly, the generics companies will also be allowed to make combinations of 
drugs from different companies. Mohga Kamal-Yanni, Oxfam senior health policy 
adviser, urged other companies to follow Gilead into the pool and that those that 
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have not done so should be ‘ashamed of themselves’.166 His strong tone suggests the 
severity of world health problems and the belief that pharmaceutical companies have 
the power to change the circumstances.  
 
Aside from these efforts, it has been shown that the flexibilities in TRIPS do stand as 
sufficient safeguards against the brunt of strong patent protection for developing 
countries. Developing countries like India have taken advantage of compulsory 
licensing in establishing its growing pharmaceutical industry. It is a successful 
example of a developing country that has sculpted its domestic patent laws in a 
manner that is in compliance with TRIPS requirements while maintaining its national 
interests as top priority. The recent court ruling reflects India’s continuing 
protectionist nature and the flexibility in interpretation of international agreements 
display the nation’s desire to advance internationally. In rejecting several patent 
applications by pharmaceutical companies so as to protect its own domestic industry, 
India has emerged as a power not to be trifled with. This suggests that with the right 
actions taken by the government and the right laws in place, other developing 
countries can also reap the benefits of a flourishing pharmaceutical industry. 
Cooperating with developed countries would help to create patent-protection systems 
that would fulfill both nations' demands in protecting intellectual properties and 
fostering techno-economic growth. 
Other options for accessing less expensive supply include trying to access 
differential prices of the originator’s product through ‘access’ programmes, pooling 
demand for bulk purchasing, tapping in to less expensive sources of the originator’s 
product through parallel importing, issuing a TRIPS compliant compulsory license, 
or in eligible countries, ensuring that domestic legislation allows the country to take 
advantage of the TRIPS extension for least developed countries until 2016. 
Developing countries should view the patent-protection system as a tool for 
economic development. If a developing country does not have the capabilities to 
develop an industry for pharmaceuticals, it can still diminish the impacts of strong 
patent protection by formulating more efficient local laws and policies that target 
specific groups of people or the government can seek to collaborate with 
pharmaceutical companies and public interest groups to improve the provision of 
                                                        
166 Ibid. 
 60 
affordable medicines. The incorporation of new rules and regulations of TRIPS into 
the national patent systems of developing countries could be the initial step toward 
reforming patent protection systems. National leaders from developing countries 
should set up a committee for analyzing the pros and cons of reforming patent 
protection systems, and then move toward restructuring those systems to promote 
further development in their growing economies.167 
Initially, it may be costly initially for developing countries to adopt such a system 
but this should be offset with the possibility of long-term economic growth. With 
stronger patent protection systems in place, developing countries can assure 
appropriate rewards for pharmaceutical companies and help them invest into the 
local technological market. It may also help to generate an increased flow of FDI and 
R&D investments into developing country markets. Therefore, developing countries 
should reform their patent protection structures for their own technological and 




In the past 60 years, innovation and technology have driven huge improvements in 
global health. Growth in life expectancy that took over 300 years to achieve in 
developed countries has been secured by developing countries in just half a century, 
thanks largely to innovations in medicine and other public health interventions. 
Intellectual property has played a key role in this progress.  
 
This paper points out that patents on pharmaceuticals are a necessary “evil” for the 
development of new and improved medicines to treat the world’s health. In line with 
the historical notions on the justification of intellectual property, the drive to 
innovate is closely determined by the strength of protection offered by patents. 
Without the exclusivity and assurance, not only are inventors less willing to expend 
time and effort into discovering and creating new drugs, investors are also less 
inclined to pump substantial capital into an environment where they do not foresee 
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any profits. This jeopardizes the well-being of future patients and the innovation 
process itself. Financial capital is a critical component in the pharmaceutical sector 
as a large amount of money is needed in the development of new medicines for both 
the employment of skilled individuals and the tedious R&D process. This in turn 
ensures that products churned out by pharmaceutical companies are of a high 
standard, which brings positive benefits to patients such as fewer side effects and 
more effective treatment of diseases.  
 
With regards to the high prices on drugs set by pharmaceutical companies that has 
made essential medicines out of reach of the poor, it is not a matter that cannot be 
solved as seen from successful examples set by developing countries like India. 
Although it is arguable that India has the infrastructure to build a robust 
pharmaceutical industry that other developing countries do not, its success should 
primarily be credited to the effective policies and actions by the Indian government. 
Through its adherence to traditional values of protectionism, India has emerged as a 
country not to be trifled with. Instead of being resistant to change, the nation has 
adapted well and built upon changes in the international landscape to bring 
prosperity to its economy.  
 
As such, it is observed that the main responsibility for ensuring public health lies 
with local governments and national institutions. Governments have the duty to 
respect, protect and fulfill the right to health of its people progressively, within their 
means. In order to adapt to the changes in the international environment regarding 
patent laws, governments should do their best to ensure availability, accessibility, 
acceptability and quality of health services. Such actions may include reforming 
current healthcare systems to positively impact the health of the poor and 
collaborating with pharmaceutical companies to ensure the affordable and effective 
provision of medicine on both a local and international scale.  
At present, the lack of access to medicines issue suggests that the right to health is 
not being effectively fulfilled. The pharmaceutical industry has a special 
responsibility to contribute to improving access to medicines. The primary function 
of the research-based pharmaceutical corporations is to create value by discovering 
and producing effective medicines that improve patients’ well-being. It is necessary 
for the pharmaceutical industry to keep in mind these wise words:  
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“Essential medicines are not a luxury whose availability can be left to private 
market forces only, but an essential component of the fulfillment of the right to 
health”.  
With this mentality in mind, pharmaceutical companies should take a different 
approach in their business models and put public interests before profits. Innovative 
alliances, financing mechanisms and cost-sharing models are essential to ensure that 
patients worldwide can access existing medicines. This can include applying 
differential pricing strategies and market segmentation to make medicines more 
affordable for those with low purchasing power, provided there is political 
safeguarding to prevent diversion of medicines to mature markets. In order to fully 
cater to the interests of the society, pharmaceutical companies should also direct 
focus towards developing treatments for neglected, poverty-related diseases, which 
they deem to have little prospect of being profitable. Through the responsible use of 
patents, it is possible for the pharmaceutical industry to make a vital contribution in 
ensuring broad access to existing life-saving medicines.  
Development is a gradual process and it is not impossible. This essay puts forth the 
idea that medical innovation and public affordability can and should co-exist. With 
the right policies and laws in places, coupled with strong support from wealthy 
developing countries and pharmaceutical companies, the lack of access issue can be 
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